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1 Introduction
Most OECD countries devote a substantial share of public resources to social
transfers in order to redistribute income and reduce poverty. To assess the poverty
effectiveness of such social transfers, it is usual to compute the change in poverty
that they induce. In order to do this, a benchmark of pre-transfer income is first
defined; the distributional impact of social transfers is then estimated as the fall
in poverty estimated following the addition of the transfers, with or without the
presence of behavioral responses. The poverty effectiveness of the transfers in
alleviating poverty can also be computed per dollar of transfer.
A problem arises, however, in evaluating the impact of a set of social trans-
fers that operate simultaneously. The order in which the transfers are ranked can
indeed influence the estimates of the poverty reduction effect attributed to each
individual transfer in the set. To illustrate this, consider the case of a country with
two identical universal transfers. Assume that each transfer awards everyone a
transfer equal to the poverty line (regardless of his/her income), so that no person
is poor after the implementation of any of the two. If the benchmark income used
to estimate the poverty effectiveness of one transfer includes the other transfer,
none of the transfer will show any impact on poverty, albeit both lead to a total
eradication of poverty when the other program is not included in the benchmark
income. Since it usually arbitrary to prefer one order to the other, it would seem
useful to think of a sharing rule that assigns each transfer a poverty impact that
does not depend on the ranking of the various income sources. 1
The paper proposes such a rule by importing from cooperative game theory
the use of the Shapley value. The procedure can be used for positive (transfers,
earnings, capital income, etc.) or negative sources of income (such as income
taxes). The paper also computes the effect of income sources across wide ranges
of poverty lines and for broad classes of poverty indices in order to address the
difficult of selecting “one” poverty line.
The paper then studies the poverty effects of a comparable set of social trans-
fers that are in force in five OECD countries. Comparing national experiences
on social transfers and poverty alleviation effects may provide useful policy guid-
ance on alternative means of achieving social objectives. Social transfers differ
both in terms of their scale and in terms of their distribution. Scale matters for
the total change in poverty induced by a social transfer; distribution relates to the
1See for instance, Smeeding (2006), who computes the poverty impact of social insurance and
social assistance benefits in 11 OECD countries without addressing this issue.
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effectiveness of poverty alleviation per dollar of transfer spent. Further, due to the
size effect of the different income sources, their effectiveness in reducing poverty
is measured using an indicator which weighs up the scale and the distribution of
each income source.
The paper uses data on five OECD countries drawn from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS) (http://www.lisproject.org), each with a recent 1999-2000
LIS database. They are Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and
Sweden. The choice of these countries is based both on the availability of data
and on the presence of similar national welfare programs across them.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the poverty
lines and the poverty measures. Section 3 describes the sharing rule used to esti-
mate the scale and the distribution of the poverty impact of different social trans-
fers. Section 4 applies the methodology to five OECD countries with similar tax
and transfer systems. Section 5 concludes.
2 Poverty
How poverty is defined and measured is important for understanding poverty;
it is also important for understanding the effectiveness of poverty alleviation pro-
grams. One influential definition of poverty is that it exists when one or more
persons fall short of a level of consumption of goods and services deemed to con-
stitute a reasonable minimum, either in some absolute sense or by the standards
of a specific society Lipton and Ravallion 1995. This, however, usually involves
the selection of one or a few arbitrary poverty lines. To guard against this degree
of arbitrariness, the paper will compare the impact of income sources over wide
ranges of poverty lines (see Section 4.2).
Note that this paper will use absolute poverty lines. With relative poverty
lines, a social transfer that raises the incomes of all, but proportionally more those
of the non-poor, may worsen poverty, albeit the absolute income of the poor has
increased. Conversely, a progressive tax income that decreases everyone’s income
but proportionally more that of the non-poor, will reduce poverty, although the
absolute income of the poor falls.
There is also the issue of which poverty index to use to estimate the effective-
ness of redistributive policies. The most popular poverty index is the incidence of
poverty, namely, the proportion of the population living with less than the poverty
line. It has often been criticized (see for instance Sen (1976)) for only capturing
the changes in the proportion of the population that is poor, and not capturing
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the changes in the well-being of the poor. Moreover, most anti-poverty welfare
programs are often not designed to lift the poor entirely out of poverty; they do,
however, purport to improve their living standards. This may not be adequately
captured by the use of the poverty headcount.
Instead of just one index at one poverty line, we will use indices that are mem-
bers of the popular (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984) (FGT) family of poverty
indices over ranges of poverty lines. Let z be a real poverty line. The FGT indices
are defined as
Pα(y, z) = 100
∫ z
0
(
z − x
z
)α
dFy(x), (1)
where Fy(x) is the cumulative distribution function of income y. α is a “poverty
aversion” parameter; it captures the sensitivity of the index to changes in the dis-
tribution2. As is well known, P0(y, z) is the incidence of poverty (the headcount
ratio), P1(y, z) is the normalized average poverty gap measure (the “intensity” of
poverty), and P2(y, z) is often described as an index of the “severity” of poverty
– it weights poverty gaps by poverty gaps. For α > 1, Pα(y, z) is sensitive to the
distribution of incomes among the poor, and when α becomes very large, Pα(y, z)
approaches a Rawlsian measure (Rawls 1971).
3 Impact of income sources on poverty
3.1 The Shapley value
Consider T income sources, including market income, transfers (social secu-
rity, welfare, child benefits, etc.), and taxes. These income sources impact simul-
taneously on total income and individual poverty; we wish, however, to infer their
separate contribution to total poverty reduction, in order for instance to determine
which ones are more cost effective in redistributing income and reducing poverty.
To do this, we consider a rule based on the Shapley value. First, we need to
specify a baseline situation, which we assume to be given by the distribution in
which the income of everyone is nil. From (1), this means that initial poverty
is equal to 100 regardless of the value of α. Suppose now that the T sources
of income are ordered in a certain way. The poverty reduction due to the first
source of income, market income say, is computed assuming that it is the unique
2See Zheng (1997) for a discussion of this.
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source of income; 100 minus the level of poverty with market income is then the
contribution of market income to poverty alleviation. Next, the additional fall in
poverty owing to the second source, social security say, is calculated by adding
social security to market income. This pattern is repeated until total poverty re-
duction – achieved through total income – is allocated across the various income
components.
The above is sometimes called an “incremental benefit” allocation procedure.
It uses just one of the many possible orders in which income sources can be
ranked. There is usually no ethical or other justification for a particular given or-
dering. An order also generally “overestimates” the contribution to overall poverty
reduction of the income source that is included first in the ordering, and underes-
timates the contribution of the income source included last.
The Shapley value can help address such concerns. Let Y be the set of all
income sources yi, i = 1, ..., T , including negative ones such as income taxes.3
Some income sources may be grouped to form a subset S of Y (S ⊆ Y ). Define
Si as a subset of Y that does not include yi, i.e., Si ⊆ Y \{yi}, and piα(Si, z) as
a characteristic function that satisfies piα(∅, z) = 0, where ∅ is the empty set. For
a subset Si, piα(Si, z) is the contribution of the welfare elements included in Si to
total poverty reduction ∆Pα(Y, z) = 100− Pα(Y, z), regardless of the effect that
any yi external to Si may have. Since some elements of Si may contribute more to
piα(Si, z) than others, the question arises as to how to distribute piα(Si, z) across
the elements of Si. To address this issue, several approaches have been suggested.
The most popular one was introduced by Shapley (1953). It fulfills the following
axioms.
Axiom 1 Efficiency: The overall poverty reduction generated by Y is the sum of
piα(yi, z), that is, the poverty reduction effected by each income source i:
T∑
i=1
piα(yi, z) = ∆Pα(Y, z) = 100− Pα(Y, z) = piα(Y, z). (2)
Axiom 2 Symmetry: If yi and yj are symmetric (or perfectly substitutes), i.e.,
piα(Si,j ∪ {yi}, z) = piα(Si,j ∪ {yj}, z), then:
piα(yi, z) = piα(yj, z). (3)
3The value of these income sources will usually be adjusted for differences in individual needs
and family composition, to be expressed in adult-equivalent income units.
5
Axiom 3 Focus: Whenever yi does not change poverty, i.e., piα(Si ∪ {yi}, z) =
piα(Si, z), then:4
piα(yi, z) = 0. (4)
Axiom 4 Additivity: The cumulative poverty reduction generated by S is the sum
of the poverty reduction effected by each of its components. Or, phrased differ-
ently, ∀Si,j ⊆ Y \{yi, yj}, we have:
piα(Si,j ∪ {yi, yj}, z) = piα(Si,j ∪ {yi}, z) + piα(yj, z) (5)
= piα(Si,j ∪ {yj}, z) + piα(yi, z).
The Shapley value induces an allocation rule piα(.) that allocates to each in-
come source yi a weighted mean of the source’s marginal (incremental) contribu-
tion to overall poverty reduction. It is the only allocation rule that satisfies the
axioms listed above. The poverty reduction that yi gets with the characteristic
function piα(.) is:
piα(yi, z) =
1
2(T−1)!
∑
R
[
Pα
(
SRi ∪ {yi}, z
)− Pα (SRi , z)] (6)
where R crosses the 2(T−1)! possible permutations of Y and SRi ⊆ Y \{yi} is the
subset of income sources preceding yi within the order R. Equation (6) clearly
shows that the contribution of an income source yi to overall poverty reduction
is obtained by averaging its marginal contribution over all the possible different
permutations SRi from which piα(yi, z) can be computed.
3.2 The poverty effectiveness of income sources
We can think of the poverty effectiveness of a social transfer as depending
both upon the poverty change it yields and the size of the budgetary cost that it
generates.5 Indeed, for policy purposes, it is important to take into account both
the “benefit” and the “cost” of the use of social transfers for distributive purposes.
To integrate the cost and the benefit of redistributive transfers, we may simply
divide the poverty impact of an income source by the size of that source. Let y∗i
4This is the well-known “dummy” axiom in cooperative game theory.
5This distinction is not always made; see for instance Makdissi, Therrien, and Wodon (2006)
and Smeeding (2006) for comparative studies of the poverty effect of redistributive transfers in
Canada and United States.
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be income from source i, (i = 1, ..., T ).6 Then, the average of y∗i expressed as a
percentage of the absolute poverty line, z, is:
yi =
100
z
∫ +∞
0
y∗i dF (y
∗
i ), (7)
where F (y∗i ) is the distribution function of income source y
∗
i . The ratio of piα(yi, z)
to yi yields Γα(yi, z), the poverty impact of income source i for a value of yi equal
to the poverty line:
Γα(yi, z) = 100δ
piα(yi, z)
yi
, (8)
where δ = 1 or −1 according to whether the income source i is positive or nega-
tive.
Comparing Γα(yi, z) across i can help assess which transfers are most effective
in reducing poverty per dollar spent, or which taxes are least costly in terms of
poverty aggravation per dollar generated. 7 Whenever Γα(yi, z) > Γα(yj, z), each
dollar spent on program i reduces poverty more on average than that spent on
program j.
4 The poverty effectiveness of transfers, taxes and
market income across some OECD countries
The methodology presented above is illustrated using data from the Luxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS) for Canada (CA), United States (US), United Kingdom
(UK), Germany (DE), and Sweden (SE). For four of these countries, a (relatively)
recent 2000 LIS database is available (1999 for the UK). These countries also have
relatively similar tax and transfer systems that feature:8
1. Market Income (MI);
2. Old-age Benefits (OB);
3. Child Benefits (CB);
6This will usually be income per person, unlike yi, which would usually be adult-equivalent
income.
7If yi stands for a tax, Γα(yi, z) measures the poverty increase per dollar of tax raised from i.
8A detailed content of some of these income sources can be found in Table 1.
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4. Unemployment Benefits (UB);
5. Social Assistance and Insurance (SAI);
6. Other Income Sources (OS);
7. Income Taxes (IT) ;
8. Payroll Taxes (PT);
9. Other Direct Taxes (OT);
10. Net Income (NI).
To adjust for differences in household composition, we use the OECD-modified
equivalence scale proposed by Hagenaars, de Vos, and Zaidi (1994) that assigns
a weight of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional adult, and of 0.3
to each child who is less than 14 years old. To compare poverty across countries,
we need a poverty line that represents the same purchasing power across the re-
tained countries. For this, we first select the US official (absolute) poverty line
and convert it for other countries into specific (absolute) poverty standards using
the purchasing power parities (PPP) found in OECD (2005).
Tables 2 and 3 show some descriptive statistics related to the PPP, the absolute
poverty lines in domestic currencies, and the mean of the different income sources
across the countries. All of the statistics presented in Table 3 are expressed in
percentage of the equivalent of the US official poverty line.
As one may expect, Table 3 shows that market income is the most important
income source in the five countries. It ranges from 225 percent of the poverty
line (z) in the US to 140 percent of the same poverty standard in Sweden. Market
income is followed by old-age benefits, which range from roughly 29 percent of
z in Germany to 11 percent in United Kingdom. The importance of the other
positive income sources varies from one country to another. For instance, social
assistance and insurance (beyond unemployment benefits) range from 18 percent
of z in Sweden to 5.1 percent in Canada. Sweden and Germany devote by far
the highest absolute effort in dollar terms in social transfers, while the United
states and, to a lesser extent, Canada spend the least. The united States devotes
roughly 10 percent of its total market income in social transfers; this corresponds
to roughly half the share of market income spent for the same purpose in the
UK, and to about a third of the effort made in Sweden and Germany. Somewhat
unsurprisingly, the tax burden is highest in both absolute and relative terms in
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Sweden and Germany, and is lowest in relative terms in United Kingdom, Canada
and United States.
4.1 Poverty impact
The impact of the different income sources on poverty incidence and deficit,
pi0(yi, z) and pi1(yi, z), is displayed in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. As expected,
the poverty impact by income source is largely correlated with the share of the
source in total income. Thus, the largest income source, market income, con-
tributes most to lowering the incidence and the deficit of poverty, whereas several
social transfers contribute absolutely little to overall poverty reduction. With their
piα(yi, z) varying between -5 percent and -0.4 percent, the different taxes do not
seem to worsen significantly either the incidence or the deficit of poverty. In any
case, their negative impact is largely offset by the important positive effects of the
social transfers.
A higher poverty reduction impact for market income is also naturally ob-
served in those countries where market income is highest, namely, Canada and
the US. Despite a higher average level of market income in the US, Tables 4 and 5
show roughly the same reduction in the incidence and in the deficit of poverty in
Canada. This suggests (as will be confirmed below) a higher poverty effectiveness
of market income in Canada than in the US.
Estimates of poverty effectiveness are shown in the last five columns of Table
4 for the incidence of poverty, i.e, Γ0(yi, z), and in the last five columns of Table
5 for the deficit of poverty, Γ1(yi, z). Both of these tables show that the poverty
effectiveness of income sources is weakly correlated with the size of the sources.
Sweden for instance, which is the poorest country in terms of market income (see
Table 3), performs best in reducing the incidence and the deficit of poverty per
dollar of market income. Sweden is followed by the UK, Germany and Canada,
which all show poverty effectiveness indices that are not statistically different
from each other, with the US lagging statistically behind.
Social transfers are sometimes more cost-effective than market income in re-
ducing the incidence of poverty. This may seem surprising given that social trans-
fers are usually designed and targeted to reduce poverty. Social transfers are,
however, always more cost-effective in reducing the deficit of poverty.
To understand why this is so, consider Figure 1, which shows the case of one
individual with two possible distributions of two income sources, y1 and y2. We
can think of these two distributions A and B as two hypothetical distributions of
market income (y1) and social transfers (y2). At point A, the individual receives a
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level of market income y1 that is just lower than the poverty line (z) and a transfer
y2 that is much less important than y1. Since none of these income sources alone is
sufficient to escape poverty, one finds (using (6)) that pi0(y1, z) = pi0(y2, z) = 50.9
If, however, y1 is increased marginally so that it just exceeds z with y2 remaining
unchanged, as shown by point B on Figure 1, then both pi0(y1, z) and Γ0(y1, z)
jump discretely, and pi0(y2, z) and Γ0(y2, z) both fall discretely to zero. Hence, if
social transfers are not quite enough on their own to bring people out of poverty,
they may be judged not to be cost-effective in terms of poverty headcount alle-
viation. This also suggests that measures of the poverty effectiveness of income
sources based on the poverty headcount can be quite sensitive to small changes
in the sizes of the sources. Finally, measures of poverty effectiveness based on
the poverty headcount can also be sensitive to the choice of the poverty line. On
Figure 1, increasing the poverty line above the level of y1 at B would lead to
pi0(y1, z) = pi0(y2, z) = 50 at point B.
Most social transfers (recall Table 1) in OECD countries are indeed not de-
signed to bring on their own individuals completely out of poverty; they are rather
aimed at alleviating their individual poverty gap. As a result, using the headcount-
based Γ0(yi, z) can fail to assess properly the achievement of poverty objectives. It
may be better to use Γ1(yi, z) and think instead in terms of alleviating the poverty
deficit.
The effect of doing this can again be understood from Figure 1. On Figure 1,
pi1(y1, z) and pi1(y2, z) are proportional to y1 and y2 at point A, and we therefore
have that Γ1(y1, z) = Γ1(y2, z) at that point. The movement fromA toB increases
pi1(y1, z) marginally, but not discretely, and so pi1(y2, z), Γ1(y1, z) and Γ1(y2, z)
do not jump either. Measures of poverty effectiveness based on the poverty deficit
are therefore much less sensitive to changes in the sizes of income sources and to
the choice of the poverty line than measures of poverty effectiveness based on the
poverty headcount. They are also better at capturing the effectiveness of policies
that are not necessarily designed to bring individuals completely out of poverty.
Coming back to Table 5, we find that Γ1(yi, z) for child benefits in Canada
and for social assistance and insurance in the UK is particularly large, suggesting
that these transfers display substantial poverty effectiveness. The various taxes in
the UK, United Germany and Canada impact little the poor relative to their sizes.
This suggest that the tax system of these countries succeeds better than the US
and Sweden in not burdening the poor with taxes.
9Since y2 < y1 while pi0(y1, z) = pi0(y2, z), this also means that (using (8)) Γ0(y2, z) >
Γ0(y1, z).
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis
The above results clearly depend on the choice of a poverty line. To check the
sensitivity of these results, we draw piα(yi, z) and Γα(yi, z) over poverty lines that
range from 0 to 200 percent of the official US poverty threshold. For expositional
simplicity, we put together all social transfers into one set referred to as “social
transfers” and we do the same for the different taxes. As a result, we obtain three
types of income sources: market income, social transfers, and taxes. A fourth type
is the sum of the first three, and we refer to it as net income.
Two groups of countries strike out of Figures 2 and 3 in terms of market in-
come. The first group includes United States and Canada. The second one re-
groups the UK, Germany and Sweden. The two ountries of the first group dom-
inate those of the second group in terms of poverty impact since they show the
highest piα(yi, z) whatever the value of the poverty line and for α equal to 0 and
1. Interestingly, Figure 3 shows that Canada dominates the US in terms of market
income for the poverty deficit, albeit US market income is higher on average.
Social transfers reduce poverty significantly more in Germany and in Sweden
than in the US and Canada, both in terms of poverty headcount and deficit. The
UK stands at an intermediate position in that respect for any poverty standard
lower than 100 percent of the US line for the headcount and even up to 200 percent
of the US threshold for the poverty deficit.
Taxes impose a higher poverty burden in Sweden than in the four other coun-
tries. This is true for both values of α and for all of the poverty lines considered.
For the poverty deficit, two other subgroups stand out. The first includes the UK
and Canada, where taxes impact least on poverty, and the second includes Ger-
many and the US, at a middle position between Sweden and the UK/Canada.
The net effect of market income, social transfers and taxes is summarized by
the net income curves. Interestingly enough, no country differs markedly from the
others in the final poverty outcome. With a more generous social transfer system,
Sweden manages to compensate for its lower level of market income and more
burdensome tax system. Germany also achieves significant net poverty reduction
through its transfer system in spite of lower market income. Canada and the US
compensate for a weaker poverty impact of social transfers with a significantly
higher poverty impact of market income. The UK does (almost) as well as the
other countries for most of the poverty lines because of a relatively large impact
of social transfers and a tax system that impacts little on poverty.
The results look quite different when we turn to poverty effectiveness. Per dol-
lar of market income, Figure 4 shows that Sweden dominates the other countries
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with respect to poverty impact. Although market income may therefore be lower
on average in Sweden, it has a relatively larger poverty reduction impact. Taxes
in Sweden, however, cause the greatest poverty burden relative to their average
size, and social transfers are not as strikingly different from the other countries
(as in Figures 2 and 3) if we normalize their impact by their size. Overall, how-
ever, in spite of an average poverty effectiveness of social transfers and a weak
performance in terms of taxes, Sweden comes out on top in terms of net income
poverty effectiveness. This says that per dollar of net income, poverty reduction
is greatest in Sweden. This is true on Figures 4 and 5 for both values of α and for
a wide range of poverty lines.
At the other extreme, Figures 4 and 5 show that the US almost always fares
worse in terms of poverty effectiveness than the other countries – the only ex-
ception being that the US tax system is relatively good at avoiding the poor even
relative to its average size. This is most striking in the case of market income and
social transfers. The end result is hat net income is less poverty efficient in the US
than in the other four countries.
Several of the Γ0(yi, z) curves based on the headcount displayed in Figure 4
intersect, often at low poverty lines. The results are more clear-cut when on Figure
5 when the impact on the poverty deficit is considered. The UK does particularly
well in that light. Only Sweden dominates it in terms of net income poverty effec-
tiveness. The UK dominates all other countries, including Sweden, in terms of the
effectiveness of social transfers, suggesting that the UK is relatively successful in
the poverty targeting of those transfers. Canada is the country with the greatest
success (per dollar of taxes raised) at avoiding an increase in the poverty deficit.
Canada does also well at targeting transfers towards the reduction of the poverty
deficit.
5 Conclusion
An understanding of the social benefits and costs of taxes and transfers is
crucial for sound public policy. Identifying these benefits and costs is not neces-
sarily straightforward when the taxes and transfer interact simultaneously, as they
usually do. The paper proposes a methodology for doing this, focussing on the
poverty alleviation effect of various income sources. The paper also distinguishes
between the poverty impact and the poverty effectiveness of income sources. The
poverty impact measures the absolute change in poverty caused by an income
source; the poverty effectiveness normalizes that impact by the size of the income
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source.
This methodology is applied to data from five OECD countries: the United
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden. We find that the
poverty impact of market income in the US and Canada is higher than that in
Sweden, Germany or the UK. However, more generous social transfers in Sweden,
Germany and the UK lead them to roughly the net poverty outcome as in Canada
and the US. Poverty impact is not, however, the same as poverty effectiveness.
For instance, while social transfers in the UK are roughly half as large as those in
Sweden, they are more poverty effective in the UK than in Sweden.
In brief, the findings show that US market income has the greatest poverty
impact across all countries, that Swedish market income is most poverty effec-
tive, that Swedish social transfers have the greatest poverty impact, that the UK
social transfers are most poverty effective (and are thus most effective at poverty
targeting), and that the Canadian tax system is most successful at not increasing
poverty. Conversely, the paper finds that Swedish market income has the least
poverty impact, that the American distribution of market income is least poverty
effective, that the US social transfers have the least poverty impact and are the
least poverty effective, and that the Swedish tax system is least successful at not
increasing poverty.
Note finally that in order to go beyond these findings and perform actual policy
recommendations, one should also take into account possible behavioral responses
to social programs that may affect market and net income in any country. Further,
even if the poor do profit more from a given distribution of social transfers, this
does not necessary mean that an increase in the budget devoted to those transfers
would also go largely to the poor. These and other aspects would need to be
carefully addressed prior to suggesting policy reforms. They would also form a
natural extension of the current paper.
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Table 1: Elements involved in each composite income source
Market income Cash property income
(MI) Gross wages and salaries
Private occupational pensions
Farm self-employment income
Non-farm self-employment income
Social assistance and insurance Sickness benefits
(SAI) Disability benefits
Occupational injury and disease benefits
Maternity and other family leave benefits
Military, veterans, and war benefits
Other social insurance benefits
Social assistance cash benefits
Near cash benefits
Other income sources In-kind earnings
(OS) Alimony child support
Regular private transfers
Imputed rent for owner housing
Payroll taxes Mandatory employee contributions
(PT) Mandatory self-employment contributions
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (per adult equivalent adult)
CA US UK DE SE
Purchasing power parity 1.21 1 0.641 0.994 9.31
Absolute poverty line 10 089 9 000 5 769 8 946 83 790
(z; in domestic currency)
Mean net income (ratio to z) 234.3 304.1 208.9 212.6 181.4
Median net income (ratio to z) 205 253.5 171.6 186.4 166
16
Table 3: Average of the different income sources per capita as a percentage of the
poverty line
yi
CA US UK DE SE
Market 178 225 150 153.9 140
income (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Old-age 13.7 15.3 10.8 29.15 21
benefits (7.7) (6.8) (7.2) (19) (15)
Child family 2.1 .007 2.5 4.1 2.7
benefits (1.2) (.0) (1.7) (2.7) (1.9)
Unemployment 2.8 .58 .17 2.6 5.2
benefits (1.6) (.26) (.1) (1.7) (3.7)
Social assistance 5.1 7.1 13.9 7 18.1
& insurance (2.9) (3.1) (9.3) (4.5) (12.9)
Total social 23.7 23 27.4 42.9 47
transfers (13.3) (10.2) (18.3) (27.9) (33.6)
Other income .78 15.8 1.4 7.9 .9
sources (.4) (7) (1) (5.1) (.6)
Income 40.2 41.9 29.8 28.9 47.8
taxes (22.6) (18.6) (19.9) (18.8) (34.1)
Payroll 7.2 14 7.2 23.7 8.6
taxes (4) (6.2) (4.8) (15.4) (6.1)
Other direct - 4.7 - - 4.1
taxes (2.1) (2.9)
Total 47.4 60.6 37 52.6 60.5
taxes (TT) (26.6) (26.9) (24.7) (34.2) (43.2)
Net income 155 203 142.2 152.04 127.6
(NI) (87.1) (90.2) (94.8) (98.7) (91.1)
Values in parentheses are the ratio of mean income source to mean market income.
Standard errors on those estimates are small and do not exceed 1.4 percent of
market income, 0.9 percent of net income and 20 percent for the other income
sources.
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